self link
Any existing encryption system can be abused by terroristsand people central to the system or else foreign countries. My system (FIBER or Family Identity Based Encryption Restricted) is based on fast discrete number theory square roots modulo semi-primes, derives it strength from published zero-knowledge proofs; can be used even in terrorist-sensitive locations, by very closed governments and can be proved safe.
Any existing encryption system can be abused by terroristsand people central to the system or else foreign countries. My system (FIBER or Family Identity Based Encryption Restricted) is based on fast discrete number theory square roots modulo semi-primes, derives it strength from published zero-knowledge proofs; can be used even in terrorist-sensitive locations, by very closed governments and can be proved safe.
Let us start with easiest to understand. Many (check ok)
people want square roots of numbers, with semi-prime, sent cryptographic ally
with respect to 1000 bit or longer numbers. If I can, send them the answer
which they can check by free square function or their own way. Otherwise I
answer “can’t” to indicate one of “don’t want to”, “not a square”, “not allowed”,
etc. How I calculate, it is my business. In some case, the answer can be found
in mail, on sites, or in directories, the user better check by squaring for
each could be hacked. The process of extraction is a proprietary very hard
cryptographic problem done on cloud, check is easy, decentralized and local!
Any string can become cryptographic ally digest using the standard
edigest gratis function. It produces a 576 bit number (regardless of string length
of the string processed by our edigest) is standard 512 bit digest appended with
64 bit length. The length append eliminates many fraudulent insertion
techniques. It is crypt-hard to find another string with that aaq-digest.
A two level encryption is used. The encryption key is by the
arun-arya method. The message itself is encrypted using the key and strongest-symmetric-encryption.
The destination key is obtained and checked once every year by the year,
public-key and registered name of the destination by the yes/no question
Question( “has-public”, year, public-key: huge, name-destination: string)
which anyone can pay say 1 cent and get answer. 1 cent
charge is sufficient to kill spammers and guessers!
The method (number, sqrt_number/standard-key) is standard ZKP in our world except that proofs can be obtained, if entitled, without knowing how they were obtained and then locally checked. This is basic to my aaquantum encryption and called XZKP or extended zero knowledge proof. Some one can assert without man-in-the middle, their public key for a year given their name. A name can be reused after 20 years only. A name terminated by year can never be reused!
All kinds of math-hair-splitting is avoided by term strongest_symmetric-encryption chosen by the designer. To undo encryption, all needed is the symmetric-key supplied by sender as a published encryption quantity that can be inverted on the cloud and results returned encrypted. Inversion is
Message("Invert", send_bits, my-semi-prime, my_family, my-public, my_root) => sym_key
The corresponding send (used some send-key) is
gratis_send( send_key, target-public, target-semi-prime, family_semi_prime ) => send_bits
which squares send_key modulo family_semi_prime and then exponentiates modulo target-semi-prime to remove any telltale squares. The result is published and can only be decoded by the target!
Proofs, general comment
All the proofs rarely use complex mathematical notation but are STILL as solid as any using the reuse principle which says that rather than start from nothing, it is always better to prove by showing that if a goal problem can be solved, then so can a known hard one. We know that square root extraction solved the factoring problem and hence is crypt-hard. We also assume without proof that all bits of the digest of a string are fully random independent of any other bits. Since digest is cryptographic, it is assumed that constructing a string with given digest is crypt-hard.
Ordered tuple
A cryptographic oorderes tuple COT places any 1+ number of objects, laid out by separators in a string form and then digested. The digest is crypt-quality witness of the tuple. Such a witness is assumed to be impossible to decode into another tuple, provided that the separators can never be sub strings of the elements. It hold for other properties of separators too, but this suffices.
Use of man-in-the-middle MITM
Positive use of MITM is basic. Let us start by making IBE from OAEP+ RSA or strong_RSA. One cannot use t\an exponent for more than one person. But let each have own semi-prime. The semi-prime of a name is published in a directory. But that entry can be hacked. So along with name and semi-prime, there is a three numbers called proof-1-3. Suppose the creator publishes three semi-prime. Proof-1 power digest(name) mod creator-number-1 equal semi-prime. So is proof-2 for creator-number-2 and proof-3 for creator-number-3. Being semi-prime, they are not common in factors by overwhelming probability. The check for a proof is easy. Solving for proof not knowing factors implies the name and semi-prime are in use but unrelated. The solution for proof-3 is crypt-hard! At least one of three equations are crypt-hard for all but the creator.
We use MITM very simply to provide a proof for a user submitted semi_prime (with a license from enclosing jurisdiction!) Since we do not know the factors, it is safe for us. Since it is licensed, it must be acceptable to the jurisdiction. One way to license is to submit the factors solely to the jurisdiction with strong encryption on communication.
Given a name and a semi-prime, considering the jurisdiction as a family, we construct the closest square to the name chosen (i.e. J(perturbed) = 0). We calculate the triple of proof to prevent a possibly long search for nearest square. The nearest square, square root of the nearest square and three proof of the supplied semi-prime are returned.
To encrypt for sending, some key is chosen. Encrypted communication with the manager of system returns target-bits which are published/sent along with the encrypted message These bits and target-data causes the encryption key to be returned encrypted in target semi-prime. Best way to select the key is output of a squaring generator.
New and fascinating is the use of MITM for imposing a repeated deadline (no generality loss assumed every year or month>). Then the factors of semi-primes used in creator proof are published! Every proof fails and has to be rebuilt without effecting any one's secrets! No matter how done, an impostor can do precisely the steps and create encryption-identical copy in impostor's semi-prime! This means that legacy certificates are valid only as long as subscribed, or somehow ensure proven tools were used.
All kinds of math-hair-splitting is avoided by term strongest_symmetric-encryption chosen by the designer. To undo encryption, all needed is the symmetric-key supplied by sender as a published encryption quantity that can be inverted on the cloud and results returned encrypted. Inversion is
Message("Invert", send_bits, my-semi-prime, my_family, my-public, my_root) => sym_key
The corresponding send (used some send-key) is
gratis_send( send_key, target-public, target-semi-prime, family_semi_prime ) => send_bits
which squares send_key modulo family_semi_prime and then exponentiates modulo target-semi-prime to remove any telltale squares. The result is published and can only be decoded by the target!
Proofs, general comment
All the proofs rarely use complex mathematical notation but are STILL as solid as any using the reuse principle which says that rather than start from nothing, it is always better to prove by showing that if a goal problem can be solved, then so can a known hard one. We know that square root extraction solved the factoring problem and hence is crypt-hard. We also assume without proof that all bits of the digest of a string are fully random independent of any other bits. Since digest is cryptographic, it is assumed that constructing a string with given digest is crypt-hard.
Ordered tuple
A cryptographic oorderes tuple COT places any 1+ number of objects, laid out by separators in a string form and then digested. The digest is crypt-quality witness of the tuple. Such a witness is assumed to be impossible to decode into another tuple, provided that the separators can never be sub strings of the elements. It hold for other properties of separators too, but this suffices.
Use of man-in-the-middle MITM
Positive use of MITM is basic. Let us start by making IBE from OAEP+ RSA or strong_RSA. One cannot use t\an exponent for more than one person. But let each have own semi-prime. The semi-prime of a name is published in a directory. But that entry can be hacked. So along with name and semi-prime, there is a three numbers called proof-1-3. Suppose the creator publishes three semi-prime. Proof-1 power digest(name) mod creator-number-1 equal semi-prime. So is proof-2 for creator-number-2 and proof-3 for creator-number-3. Being semi-prime, they are not common in factors by overwhelming probability. The check for a proof is easy. Solving for proof not knowing factors implies the name and semi-prime are in use but unrelated. The solution for proof-3 is crypt-hard! At least one of three equations are crypt-hard for all but the creator.
We use MITM very simply to provide a proof for a user submitted semi_prime (with a license from enclosing jurisdiction!) Since we do not know the factors, it is safe for us. Since it is licensed, it must be acceptable to the jurisdiction. One way to license is to submit the factors solely to the jurisdiction with strong encryption on communication.
Given a name and a semi-prime, considering the jurisdiction as a family, we construct the closest square to the name chosen (i.e. J(perturbed) = 0). We calculate the triple of proof to prevent a possibly long search for nearest square. The nearest square, square root of the nearest square and three proof of the supplied semi-prime are returned.
To encrypt for sending, some key is chosen. Encrypted communication with the manager of system returns target-bits which are published/sent along with the encrypted message These bits and target-data causes the encryption key to be returned encrypted in target semi-prime. Best way to select the key is output of a squaring generator.
New and fascinating is the use of MITM for imposing a repeated deadline (no generality loss assumed every year or month>). Then the factors of semi-primes used in creator proof are published! Every proof fails and has to be rebuilt without effecting any one's secrets! No matter how done, an impostor can do precisely the steps and create encryption-identical copy in impostor's semi-prime! This means that legacy certificates are valid only as long as subscribed, or somehow ensure proven tools were used.
No comments:
Post a Comment