Monday, May 31, 2021

Liquidity Bootstrapping FAQ

 


WHAT rest off this note after the para is added to give people a flavour of new management being forged in blockchain applications by evolution, without stupid hinderance to inventers and discoverers being constrainbed only by legitimate interests of the government to govern. Collectively it is routinely now called defi (decentrealized finance), in this case by recovery from massive hacking on etherum, the innovative fork from bitcoin.  Defi is new disruptive paradigm in finance, every one today, by my judegment, having 10 years at most. What makes neochain (my term) so powerful is DAO, smart allowing decentralized programs, starting with AMM, using non-fungible ownership beyond hacking by NFT and Law having by liquidity pools that allow entry an exit (cashing out) without effecting others as long as there is no run on the bank. I have a full non-poor life ahead of me solely by not yielding to greed and conservatisism which avoids all investments without thorogh knowledge.

How do I launch a Liquidity Bootstrapping Pool?

Decide on critical parameters, such as sale duration, starting and ending weights, and estimate the demand (i.e., expected sale rate), using the LBP simulator to adjust the settings until you are happy with the resulting price curve. (Best practice is to copy/download it, then customize to your own use case.)

Post on #token-requests to request eligibility for governance token rewards. (At least a week’s advance notice is recommended, and BAL rewards require an active CoinGecko price feed, or at least "preview" mode.) You can submit your pool metadata on this form (e.g., token symbol and name, icons for the token and pool, descriptive text, a url for the sale page, etc.)

If your pool is eligible for weekly BAL rewards, they will be distributed to your LPs automatically. See the Liquidity Mining page for staking and other special cases. If you contribute significant long-term liquidity to the platform, you can apply to have smart contract deployment gas costs reimbursed from the Balancer Ecosystem fund here.

Here's the general process to deploy a Liquidity Bootstrapping Smart Pool, conduct the token sale, and recover the proceeds:

  • When you've decided on parameters as described above, create the smart pool.

  • Call updateWeightsGradually to start the sale. (Note that unless you pause the pool, it will be visible to the exchange and available for trading immediately, though the weights are fixed until you start the update.)

  • (Optionally) call pokeWeights periodically to cause the weights to change on schedule. This is a public function that anyone can call - including from the public Pool Management interface. You can advertise this, and encourage buyers to poke for you (it can be fairly expensive). Large buyers would do well to pokeWeights before buying.

  • At the end of the sale, Remove Liquidity to recover the proceeds; i.e., the reserve balance, plus any unsold tokens. If you reserved the add/remove tokens right (and disallowed public LPs), you can simply call removeToken. Otherwise, you can remove liquidity directly - though you need to leave at least some dust behind, since there is a minimum balance of each token.

How long should an LBP last?

This is a fully customizable parameter that is up to you, based on your objectives. However we can provide some general tips. It’s important to give your potential investors sufficient time to participate and for healthy price discovery to occur. We’ve seen this process work well over a span of 3 days, but as LBPs are a new innovation, we believe there are other lengths of time that could work as well or even better.

Considering the fast pace and unpredictability of events happening regularly in DeFi, making your LBP too short could allow obstacles that are unrelated to your project (i.e., a spike in Ethereum network congestion or a new yield farming craze) to get in the way of a successful sale. We would recommend at least 3 days, but you are certainly free to make it shorter if you believe it would better serve your particular case.

Note that the default minimum duration is approximately 2 weeks (and 2 hours for the add token time lock); using a shorter period will require overriding that default when you create the pool. This mainly applies to those writing scripts; if you use the smart pool GUI, the defaults are very short (both 10 blocks).

Should I start the sale immediately after deploying the pool?

Most LBPs do this, but some choose delay the start of the sale. There are many reasons for this, including waiting for the whitelisting/price feed to be set up, and wanting more time for pre-sale marketing/community building.

Projects that choose this method typically reserve the right to "pause swapping," and invoke it immediately after creating the pool. Since smart pools are created with swapping enabled, pausing is a separate transaction, so it is possible to "front-run" the pause transaction and perform a swap before the pause takes effect. (Don't laugh - it's happened!)

You can't beat human nature. Even though it's irrational, and the LBP announcements all encourage people to wait, we have observed an initial price spike in nearly every LBP to date. So if you choose to do a "delayed" LBP, you will be vulnerable to this sort of front-running.

The only way to completely prevent this is to write code to deploy and pause in a single transaction. Otherwise, one way to discourage early buying is to reserve the right to change the swap fee, and initialize it to 10% (the max). That way anybody front-running your pause transaction will pay a 10% fee on top of the high price. After the pause transaction is mined, you can drop the fee to the desired sale rate.

Any time there is a price spike - even with sales that start right away - arbers can exploit it. So it's more of a "user education" issue than a technical front-running problem. The long-term solution is to educate LBP buyers that patience is a virtue.

How should I choose a starting price?

You can think of the starting price of your LBP as the ceiling you’d want to set for the token sale. This may seem counterintuitive, but since LBPs work differently than other token sales, your starting price should be set much higher than what you believe is the fair price.

This does not mean you’re trying to sell the token above what it’s worth. Setting a high starting price allows the changing pool weights of your LBP to make their full impact, lowering the price progressively until a market equilibrium is reached. Unlike older token sale models such as bonding curves, LBP investors are disincentivized to buy early, and instead benefit from waiting for the price to decrease until it reaches a level they believe is fair.

For example, if you believe the fair price for your token is $2, you may want to consider an opening price that is up to $10.

The general idea is to start with the pool weights skewed towards your token and end with the pool weights skewed towards the reserve asset(s). This configuration is designed to make it so that the majority of your tokens end up being exchanged for the reserve asset(s) you have chosen.

Be sure to think all the way through your intended sale, since there are some technical subtleties. For instance, if your weights are very close to the min/max weight boundaries, pokeWeights could fail in some edge cases where the total would temporarily be exceeded. Unless you need the maximum 98%/2% (49/1 denorm) weights, it's best to use weights that sum to a lower total number (e.g., 38/2), and put the project token first in the list when you create the pool, so that the weight decrease would be processed first. (We may be updating the GUI to avoid this issue by lowering the "resolution" in these cases - the max for a pool with canChangeWeights enabled would then be 96%/4%.)

How can I use an LBP to conduct a token sale with minimal seed capital?

The lower you set the weight(s) of the reserve asset(s) in your LBP, the less upfront capital you would need to seed your LBP. In a two-token LBP, the most skewed ratio you can set is 2:98, meaning that the pool composition will be 2% your reserve asset, and 98% the project token.

However, since the value of your project’s tokens is proportional to the value of the reserve assets you provide for the sale, the amount of funds you can raise in the sale is limited by the total value of the reserve assets you provide to the LBP.

For example, with an LBP weight ratio of 2:98 (reserve asset:project token), if your upfront capital is 50K USDC, and your starting price is 10 USDC, the amount of tokens you can sell is [(50K / 0.02) / 10] = approx. 250K tokens.

In contrast, if your upfront capital is 1M USDC, you’d be able to sell around 5M tokens.

How can I calculate different scenarios for the amount of tokens to sell, based on the amount of seed capital and pool weights?

You can use our LBP simulator to plug in your variables and see the projected results. (Best practice is to copy it so you have your own version, or even download to Excel.)

There's a lot going on there, but a good place to start is the "ad hoc" simulator at the top right. There, you can type in balances, weights, and the swap fee, and see what the initial price would be. Then you can type your starting values into the main interface on the top left, and experiment with different ending weights and sale rates to come up with a reasonable price curve. It will also display the total proceeds and leftover tokens.

You'll see right away that it is very sensitive to the sale rate. The price is derived from two values - balances and weights. And you only control one of them! Your weight "flipping" schedule determines how the weights will change over time, but (unless you intervene with further issuance or buybacks), balances only change through trades: mostly people buying your token with the reserve currency.

If people buy while the weights are constant - or someone places a huge order - the token price may go up sharply. This is how a token sale can get "stuck" on a platform like Uniswap, where the prices are set by balances only. This may be optimal for retail liquidity, but is much less so for a token sale.

In an LBP, buyers suffering sticker shock need only wait for the weights to adjust and the price to start dropping. (If they are impatient, they can call the public pokeWeights function themselves to tell the contract to update weights to the proper values at the current block.)

In practice, we have seen that the market is efficient. Traders do indeed keep the price within a fairly narrow band around the discovered market value. That is one reason we believe this is the fairest token distribution method yet discovered. And as a bonus, this price curve tends to maximize total proceeds of the sale.

Note that it may not always be possible to sell all available tokens in the desired price range with the capital available. In this case, you could either split up the sale into multiple tranches (either re-using the same pool, or making new pools, using the proceeds of each to fund the next), or alter the supply or weight function during the sale in various ways, as described below.

How can I influence the token price while running an LBP?

Unless you deposit tokens yourself during the sale (e.g, by adding additional liquidity through joinPool), the only way to affect prices during an LBP is by setting the target pool weights. Changing the target pool weights influences price, such that increasing the weight of an asset increases its relative price, and vice versa. The change in price gradually incentivizes investors to buy your token in exchange for the reserve asset(s), which then changes the balances of assets in the pool.

The design of the LBP tends to keep the sale price fairly even (or slightly declining) during the sale. However, this depends on the market buying pressure, which can only be estimated until the sale actually begins. If you have a really great project, or strong marketing, it is possible for buyers to "overpower" the weight changes and make the price drift upwards.

Conversely, if there is too little buy pressure, the price might drop faster than expected. In either case, it is possible to make the "price curve" steeper or shallower by adjusting the end weights. You can do this (as described below), up until the end of the sale, limited by your "minimum duration." For instance, if you've set the minimum duration to 2 hours, you can adjust the weights (or fine-tune the end block) until 2 hours before the final block, without extending the sale.

How do I change the weights of my LBP while it’s live?

Use the updateWeightsGradually function to put the contract into a state where it will respond to the pokeWeights call by setting all the weights according to the point on the "weight curve" corresponding to the current block. pokeWeights can be called by you, or anyone, to update the weights according to your LBP’s configuration.

You can also call updateWeight (as long as a gradual update is not running) to set weights arbitrarily - but this will not affect the price. It will transfer tokens as required such that the new balances and weights maintain current prices.

The GUI handles this for you, but in case you're not going through the GUI, and setting weights manually or programmatically, take care to use the same total denorm weights at the starting and ending points. For instance, to go from 96%/4% to 30%/70%, the start weights would be 24/1, and the end weights would be 7.5/17.5 - notice that both total to 25. The contract always interpolates linearly between the start and end weights - but the resulting price curve will only be linear if the weight totals match.

For instance, if you started at 24/1, and ended at 15/35, the percentages work out the same - but the weight curve would be shallower (i.e., go down slower).

What are the reserve assets I can sell my token for?

You can sell your token for any ERC-20 tokens. You can choose up to 7 other tokens to be used as reserve assets in your LBP token sale. Projects typically sell their tokens for highly liquid stablecoins such as DAI or USDC; and/or for WETH.

How do I get my token listed by name and logo on the Balancer exchange UI?

The Balancer team regularly monitors the crypto landscape and adds new tokens to our listings based on internal requirements. Tokens do not need to request to be listed on the exchange, as it is done proactively.

If you are launching an LBP and want to make sure that your token is listed on the exchange before launch, please contact the team for assistance.

How do I get my token whitelisted for BAL mining earnings?

This page describes the process.

After providing the initial seed capital needed to launch an LBP, do I need to deposit additional capital later?

No, you do not need any additional capital beyond the initial seed amount based on the starting weights you’ve selected for your pool. However, you do have the optional ability to deposit new capital into the pool as a buyback mechanism while the LBP is running.

If you use the LP whitelisting to disable public LPs, and wish to add liquidity yourself later, you will need to add your DSProxy address (if you're using the GUI) to the whitelist in order to do so. (On the smart pool GUI, this address can be found on the About page, under "smart pool controller".)

Can I deploy/control the LBP from a script?

Yes. Conversely, if you wrote your own script to deploy the pool (vs using the smart pool GUI), you can also manage it from the GUI. To do this, you would call setController (or use that feature on the Settings page, if you're starting from the GUI), and set it to the address you want to control the pool. You could deploy through the GUI, then setController to the account running the script (e.g., to set the swap fee dynamically based on an off-chain algorithm). To transfer it back, just call setController again from that script, setting it to your DSProxy address.

DSProxy contracts are "helper contracts" deployed per user account to make interacting with multiple pools easier and more gas-efficient. If you're starting from a script and don't have one, you can start to create a pool through the GUI, and it will prompt you to create a proxy as the first step.

The Pool Management GUI and Configurable Rights Pool are both open source. You can refer to the large test suite for many examples of how to interact with the CRP, and both the CRP suite and the Vue app contain helper functions for things like slippage and adding/removing liquidity. There are also many simulators available, linked at the bottom of the CRP Tutorial.

We've tried to make it as clear and straightforward as possible - but there are subtleties the GUI handles that you would need to hand-code in a script. For instance, balances for tokens with less than 18 must be "normalized." This includes many common tokens; e.g., USDC has 6, Compound cTokens all have 8, etc.

For instance, a balance of "10" in wei would be "10000000000000000000" for DAI (with 18 decimals), but "10000000" for USDC (with 6 decimals).

One final note - if you deploy a CRP through a script, we recommend using the standard CRPFactory (addresses here). If you deploy it "directly", it will still work, but will not be recognized by the BAL mining scripts, and you will need to do a redirect.

Can I use a "Pausable" token in the LBP?

You can, but there are special considerations in this case! Since Balancer is a permissionless protocol, once your tokens are "in the wild," anyone can do anything they want with them - including creating new Balancer pools (or Uniswap pools, or pools on any other protocol).

Normally this doesn't hurt anything - but if you pause the token contract after the sale - preventing all transfers - anyone who added liquidity to any of these other pools will no longer be able to withdraw their funds.

For this reason, your LBP pool definitely needs to use the "Must whitelist LPs" right to prevent public LPs - otherwise they could get "stuck" in this manner.

Since there is no way to prevent token holders from creating new Uniswap, Balancer, etc. pools during the sale, it would be a good idea to mention in your announcement that there is only one official pool - which does not allow adding liquidity - and any users who add liquidity to any "imposter" pools, or send them to any account they do not control, will lose funds if they fail to withdraw them before the end of the sale.

Can I allow public Liquidity Providers?

You can (though see above for special considerations when using non-standard token contracts). If you do not reserve the "Must whitelist LPs" right, anyone will be able to add liquidity to your pool. It is also possible to use the "cap" right to limit the total BPT supply (and therefore total value of the pool).

If you take this approach, there are a few things to keep in mind.

  • You will not be able to end the sale with removeToken, since you will not have anough BPT, and will need to "Remove Liquidity" to terminate the sale. Note that you cannot remove 100% from a smart pool, since there are minimum balance requirements, but you can remove very close to 100%, down to dust - whatever leaves all balances > 10^-6. One safe technique is to remove 99.9% first, see what's left, and then remove 99.9% again (if it's worth the gas).

  • It is possible for "whales" to unbalance your pool by adding large amounts of "single-sided" liquidity, instantaneously changing the prices, possibly enough to induce arbitrage and impermanent loss. Large initial balances (and swap fees) mitigate this risk. Also, the protocol prevents adding more than half the current balance of any token in a single transaction.

  • Since Balancer is a permissionless protocol, anyone can create new pools. Perhaps you have a staking protocol, and encourage LPs to stake their BPTs for additional earnings. In this case, it's important to make your users aware there might be "counterfeit" pools, and clearly direct them to your pool, whose tokens your staking contract accepts.

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Thursday, May 27, 2021

ME Research - Mind expanding on AC



AC means air conditioning. It is basic to development. Tall buildings are normally sealed against outside air. It also concentrates disease starters, virii and bacteria1A FAVORITE ARM CHAIR RESEARCH OF MINE EXPLAINS THE VAST COVID-19 LOSS IN DEVELOPED WORLD AS UNJUST REWARDS OF AC!



As an international collaboration of researchers from institutions in the U.S., Canada, Europe and Singapore, we developed a simple, cheap, scalable solution to keeping people comfortable without regulating indoor air temperature.


What's ME about this? Forever, I Thought of AC as comfortable temperature of Air. It is not, never mind thermostat and likes! Heat flows by conduction, convection and radiation. If you are in a surrounding with hot inner surfaces, then radiation is the first mode. Trivial to me, the inventor of generic triage!, only excusable by rec ency effects That is how you feel warm in winter air in sun!

So the point is to only do AC on surfaces, flowing air freely to natural state! You can run AC with windows open! Cost 50% energy! If that ain't ME, nothing is! This is century 21!

Now triage has another ME application. Why do Ramdev medicine (essentially ayurvedic cocktail of antiseptics), HIV cocktail of drugs and latest cure for Covid-19 (that uses cocktail of two monoclonal antibodies) work? In each case. The target disease is partially cured by each component, but removing just 1 cause simply means the disease depends on other paths. Testing will not certify each component as cure. But it will a cocktail!



Tuesday, May 25, 2021

Return to attributed Grammars

 


This is likely my "joy of living" as an elder away from youth indiscretions who have accepted a new stage in life but do not admit to limitations of unbeliever in shastra! Why would a 66-year-old person return to his youth roots?

1 He wishes to make, expected anonymous, significant in his terms, to vitaDAO, the magic company that will research in only central meaningful subject in his existence - extension of healthy life , to be a NFT IMM smart DAO, original development to become the guiding light of next human paradigm, which will value contributions from the only motive other than money; self application of the research. There is a joy similar to discovery of religion by still agnostic me. It is being done on blockchain with artifacts to make even origination DAO provably corruption free DAO, uses essential attributed grammars and can use the meta-compiler like Yacc to develop corruption-free.


2 He has new ideas to try, extending grammars in context-sensitive ways without introducing null production which make the result undecidable.


3 benefit from the magic insight of context sensitivity by still becoming decidable when null productions are introduced by making null derivation only one non-terminal and at the end only! This gives decidable deterministic translations, essential to upgrading crispr cas9 upgrades to DNA with proven limit of DNA sub string replaced.


4 Planet does not have tools to instantiate and use meta-compilers for building GUI, context-sensitive attributed grammars with inherited and synthesized attributes don't exist, nor do event based languages for concurrent programming like internals of UNIX, or methods to record and design genetic manipulations. Provides me with an achievable target for the rest of my life.


5 I am an engineer, not a scientist and have the luxury of a design in my mind. If little is known about a subject, paradigm shift happens, A sub paradigm on the other hand imposes a new hitherto unknown method for solution of a sub problem only, talked down by the supposed wise.


Stephen C. Johnson was my boss who rarely but incisively explained the story of Yacc, I consider it as important to spread of UNIX and textbook example of conversion of concurrent programming to linear form that all languages apply. Concurrency is easy to see, there is limited conflict between concurrent parsing of whole program, bottom-up in concurrent fashion.


If one represents the currently applicable context free production with a dot to mark the separation by the Parser seen on the left and still to be seen on the right, called an item, then the state of the compiler is a list of items. The next parser action depends on the bottom-most item. Depending on the look ahead which is the first of the non-terminal in the RHS, something that can be precomputed. The parser action can be shifted for some possibilities or reduce when a complete RHS has been seen. If more than one action then a conflict - shift/shift is just shift, reduce/reduce is bad grammar, shift/reduce can be done by semantics in many cases. Synthesized attributes are best considered as results, inherited as arguments or common position dependent values on the stack like merging of fields in language inheritance.


The result is incorporation of semantics in grammar itself without getting the full power of attributes but sufficient to solve every real problem. The metacompiler emits errors on shift-reduce conflicts, but these can be solved in actions. By adding conflict productions to the item being scanned, these errors will not show in the result.


index ::= expr {...} {+type = $expr..type} #- stack has 2 elements $expr and $type.

vitaDAO


 

 VitaDAO Whitepaper V0.1
Tyler Golato1, Paul Kohlhaas1
Draft open for public and community comment
Abstract
VitaDAO is a new cooperative vehicle for community-governed and decentralized drug development.
Our core mission is the acceleration of R&D in the longevity space and the extension of human lifeand
health-span. To achieve this, VitaDAO utilizes a combination of novel governance frameworks
and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), non-fungible tokens (NFTs), and financial
engineering tools such as algorithmic automated market makers (AMMs) that run via the Ethereum
blockchain. Today, the biopharma industry is booming with unprecedented late-stage investment
inflows, particularly in the longevity space. However, critical early-stage funding is severely lacking
and incentives between patients, researchers and industry are misaligned.
At its core, biopharma value creation is composed of intellectual property rights and research data.
Research and development has become prohibitively expensive and siloed, partially due to how
intellectual property business models work in monopolizing innovation through patent portfolios.
These mechanisms prevent the open sharing of research data, inherently disincentivizing collaboration
and transparency. They prevent the public and patients from having any real ownership in therapeutic
IP, even though their tax dollars fund much of the early-stage development. Outside of grants to fund
basic research, early-stage funding for drug development is extremely limited, and when drugs do
finally make it to market, there are strong incentives for price gouging.
VitaDAO is an open cooperative that anyone can join and support. Its goal is to acquire, support, and
finance new therapeutics and research data in the longevity space. The collective will directly hold
legal IP rights to novel early-stage projects and may develop a growing portfolio of both IP and data
assets represented as NFTs. These data assets can be made available and monetized in novel data
marketplace structures such as Ocean Marketplace, promoting both open science and novel business
models.
Ownership and governance of the VitaDAO is relegated through VITA tokens. The token can be
obtained by contributing resources, work, or funds to VitaDAO. Ownership of tokens allows its holder
to engage in decision-making and governance of VitaDAO’s research, signal support for specific
initiatives, and govern its data repositories and IP portfolio.


Table of Contents
Abstract 0
Table of Contents 1
1 Introduction and Problem Statement 2
1.1 Intellectual Property in Biopharma 2
1.2 The Evolution of Pharma and the Valley of Death 2
1.3 Longevity Will Transform Our Approach To Medicine 3
2 Solution 4
3 Core Architecture 5
3.1 Organization and Governance 5
3.2 Genesis Bootstrapping & Liquidity 6
4 Holding and Managing IP and Data Assets 6
4.1 Intellectual Property Rights 6
4.2 Data Assets 7
5 Staking & Signalling 7
6 Genesis & First Project Lifecycle 8
7 Exit Scenarios and IP Commercialisation 8
8 Open Research Questions 9
9 Conclusion 9
References 10
1
1 Introduction and Problem Statement
Current biopharma business models carry severe limitations and R&D inefficiencies at the cost of
those who should be the core stakeholders: patients in need of medication and researchers discovering
these molecules.
1.1 Intellectual Property in Biopharma
Fundamentally, value creation in biopharma is driven by two core assets: intellectual property (IP) and
research and development (R&D) data (Saha, 2011). When companies explore a use case for a new
therapeutic, they patent their discoveries to gain IP. This enables them to secure future revenue and
recoup the high costs of R&D. As companies invest billions of dollars into generating data to bring
therapeutics to market, they offset this by selling equity ownership or royalty rights (Olivier, 2020).
While IP is designed to incentivize innovation in theory, intellectual property ownership as a business
model has barely evolved in the past century and is largely analog, operating through extensive legal
contracts and bureaucratic complexities. Today, IP is one of the most valuable asset classes but
remains largely illiquid, hard to transfer, and rigid.
Moreover, the need for monopolistic IP ownership of both patents and data within biopharma
companies creates secrecy, centralization and disincentivizes much-needed collaboration and open
research in the scientific community, which could bring down the rising cost of drug development
(Bookbinder, 2020). Perfectly good drug candidates often fall to the wayside for organizational,
political, or competitive reasons. This concentration of research efforts leads to the high R&D cost
and long time-to-market that pharma is known for today. Pharma tends to only share positive R&D
data -- companies waste enormous resources ignorantly repeating each others’ failures. Under the
current system, incentives for open science, collaboration, and data sharing are severely lacking
(Ali-Khan, 2017).
On a macroscopic scale, this model leads to incentive misalignment and information asymmetry. IP
owners and sellers seeking to monopolize commercial value are not incentivized to report negative
research data. This creates a principal-agent dilemma and, in part, leads to a phenomenon coined the
“reproducibility crisis” (Sherkow, 2017). Thus, side effects or indicators of lower effectiveness of the
owned compounds are downplayed in favor of profit maximization, and valuable research findings are
“lost” for the broader scientific community and not considered during patient treatment. More
democratic, open, and transparent models are needed with a wider inclusion of stakeholders.
Lastly, the current financing and investment landscape centralizes and restricts access and
participation to early-stage biopharma from its most important stakeholders: patients and researchers.
In the US, only accredited investors may finance early-stage ventures. The market is opaque, and no
singular or efficient marketplace exists to discover or access these opportunities in a transparent
fashion.
1.2 The Evolution of Pharma and the Valley of Death
The process of drug development in the pharmaceutical industry is undergoing a significant shift in its
industrial organization. Increasingly, smaller biotech firms leverage recent academic research in the
life sciences to develop new drugs, which are then acquired by pharmaceutical giants using their
2
access to low-cost capital to purchase expertise (Lo, 2021). The number of biotech startup companies
formed due to technology licensing has shifted dramatically in recent years - from 145 in 1994 to 278
in 2000 and 1,024 in 2016. Of the 30 top-selling drugs worldwide in 2000, only five were traceable to
universities; the remaining 25 were developed by big pharma. By 2018, more than one-half of the top
30 drugs were sourced from academia (Lo, 2021). Thus, biotech universities are increasingly proving
to be untapped goldmines of valuable IP, yet often these assets are not investable until a startup is
spun out.
Assets from universities that are not out-licensed or spun out into startups remain in a difficult limbo,
known as The Valley of Death, where they often fail to move forward (Seyhan, 2019). Many of these
technologies are extremely valuable to patients, and because of this system, they will ultimately never
serve the populations they were intended to. These assets require investment and capital injections at
an earlier stage, and new open commercialization models are desperately needed to incentivize their
development.
1.3 Longevity Will Transform Our Approach To Medicine
The longevity field has the power to transform our global healthcare system completely. Age-related
diseases are among the most significant contributors to our global health burden and are responsible
for the highest costs incurred by healthcare systems (WHO, 2020).
The longevity space is experiencing a tremendous boom, in part because of its ability to address this
problem. The space is evolving rapidly in terms of understanding the aging process and its capacity to
develop health- & life-extending therapeutics (Scheibye-Knudsen, 2020). It is now a routine
procedure to reverse the aging of human cells in the laboratory dish. Correspondingly, the economics
of investing in longevity are more attractive than ever. There are 100s of new companies and funds
dedicated to research and product development in the fields of senolytics, telomeres, stem cells,
mitochondria, and gene editing (Pfleger, 2021). These are some of the core domains from which
therapies that increase lifespan will emerge.
The rush of investment into the field has the potential to rapidly accelerate these developments but
also comes with distinct problems. The “centralization” of aging research by large institutions and
billionaires has the potential to create the same problems and pitfalls that plague the pharmaceutical
industry: intransparency, restricted access, and concentrated control over therapeutics that should be
made widely available to anyone at an affordable price.
We believe the future of health- and life-extension should be open, collaborative, and
community-owned. We see longevity as an entirely new approach to medicine, one that has the
potential to prevent, as opposed to treat or intervene. This approach will completely change the way
the world approaches medical care and will profoundly impact society.
3
2 Solution
We propose the creation of VitaDAO: the first fully open and community-owned, transparent
intellectual property collective in longevity.
Members of the public can become co-owners of VitaDAO and its IP by purchasing VITA through
contributing funds, valuable research data, IP assets or performing services for VitaDAO. Ownership
and governance of VitaDAO is relegated through VITA tokens. VITA enables its holder to engage in
decision-making and governance of VitaDAO’s research, signal support for specific initiatives and
govern its data repositories and IP portfolio.
VitaDAO will acquire intellectual property rights, data and commission research to further develop
those assets. Further, it will monetize its intellectual property. In summary, VitaDAOs core assets can
consists of:
1. Intellectual property, patents and licenses to therapeutic research projects.
2. Data assets generated by funding R&D around its research projects.
3. Funds stored in its treasury, as well as unissued VITA tokens.
Intellectual property and data assets will be virtualized and represented as Non-Fungible Tokens
(NFTs), which are explained in more depth in Section 4.
In order to acquire and finance specific research proposals, VitaDAO members may elect to issue
tokens on a continuous or per-project basis, using automatic market makers (AMMs) like Balancer
Liquidity Bootstrapping Pools that enable a fair and transparent participation for prospective
members.
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3 Core Architecture
3.1 Organization and Governance
VitaDAO will be a non-incorporated partnership that consists of several core components of law and
novel smart contract architecture, including:
1. VitaDAO’s governance smart contract architecture, instituting a legally binding agreement
between all participants, modelled after Moloch DAO and the LAO.
2. VitaDAO’s contribution and liquidity bootstrapping mechanism utilising Balancer Liquidity
Bootstrapping Pools (LBPs) on a continuous basis (Balancer Labs, 2020).
3. VitaDAO’s NFT-based intellectual property holdings and data assets.
VitaDAO’s smart contract architecture enables members, which hold VITA to freely engage in
governance decisions pertaining to the assets and funds held by the collective. At its core, Vita will be
member-managed and rely on a Dapp and related smart contracts to facilitate the purchase, funding
and management of IP and data assets.
VitaDAO will rely on service providers (initially Molecule GmbH, legal advisors and other web3
development teams) to facilitate various administrative, legal and development functions pertaining to
the purchase and transfer of IP from universities, updating and maintaining the Dapp, validating and
formatting information selected by members and handling other interactions that may emerge over its
initial genesis and lifecycle.
The collective will not only govern over its existing structure, but its members will also propose and
vote on how to refine its governance processes. It is thus bestowed with the hard-coded ability to
rectify any shortcomings with a majority vote and to incorporate future progress in governance
developments in its system governance.
VitaDAO members are fully in control of all governance decisions by voting on VitaDAO proposals.
Proposals consist of several types, including governance proposals, project proposals, funding
proposals, data monetization proposals, and IP proposals. The types of proposals to be considered can
be expanded on an as-needed basis determined by members.
To provide the level of industry expertise required to be able to effectively and thoroughly evaluate
therapeutics projects, VitaDAO will elect a council of 3-6 industry experts to review its projects, data
and IP. This council assists in defining executive proposals to the VitaDAO members.
The initial goal of VitaDAO is to mimic successful execution patterns in the biotech industry, while
improving on those that do not work well. Over time, we expect further governance mechanisms to
emerge around VitaDAO.
In summary:
1. VitaDAO members are fully in control of all governance decisions by voting on VitaDAO
proposals.
2. VitaDAO will elect a council of 6 industry experts to review its projects, data and IP. This
council assists in defining executive proposals to the VitaDAO members. Furthermore,
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VitaDAO may elect to dedicate an individual executive for the community as a whole, or to
individual research projects.
3. VitaDAO may engage service providers spanning patent attorneys, contract research firms or
third party experts.
4. Our initial goal is to mimic successful execution patterns in the biotech industry. Over time,
we expect further governance mechanisms to emerge around VitaDAO.
3.2 Genesis Bootstrapping & Liquidity
For its initial Genesis, VitaDAO will deploy a Balancer Liquidity Bootstrapping Pool (Balancer Labs,
2020) to enable interested participants to contribute funds to its treasury and join the collective. As
VitaDAO grows, members may elect to create additional LBPs to onboard further projects.
We anticipate that the initial genesis will operate as follows:
1. VitaDAO will allocate a small amount of its fixed token supply into a Balancer Liquidity
Bootstrapping Pool (LBP) with the goal to raise suf ficient funds to finance the first
project for two years, as well as provide funds for ongoing operations to refine system
dynamics and source additional projects. The community will decide on the full fundraising
budget and structure pending simulations and crypto economic modeling using cadCAD.
2. The LBP allows the community to contribute funds and join VitaDAO for the first time.
Simultaneously, the pool acts as an important first price discovery mechanism. Individuals
wishing to join may contribute a multitude of assets, such as ETH, USDC or Ocean and
receive VITA tokens according to the corresponding $ value. The primary currency of the
LBP will be USDC to ensure price stability.
3. After a fixed period, the LBP resolves, forwarding its acquired funds to VitaDAO and kick
starting its operation. Should the LBP fail to reach a specific threshold participants may
withdraw their stakes.
4 Holding and Managing IP and Data Assets
4.1 Intellectual Property Rights
The VitaDAO collective will directly hold legal IP rights to these projects and may develop a growing
portfolio of assets represented as NFTs. In order to achieve this, Molecule is developing a novel IP to
NFT framework, which allows the holder of an existing piece of IP in the form of a license or patent,
to attach said ownership to an NFT and transfer it to a new owner.
When the NFT is created, the creator must sign a cryptographic message which prints their signature
onto an IP licensing agreement. This transaction requires both buyer and seller of the NFT to sign a
message that includes references to the transaction, their respective identities and legal signature,
modelled after the legal Signature Algorithm pioneered by Open Law (OpenLaw, 2019).
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Initially, VitaDAO will primarily hold licenses to therapeutic research projects. These licenses enable
VitaDAO, or its designated service providers, to file for patents or various forms of market exclusivity
that would grow the value of its underlying assets.
4.2 Data Assets
Besides owning IP rights related to individual projects, VitaDAO will also own any data assets and
research outputs from the work it commissions and funds. VitaDAO will safely store these assets,
make them available to its members and the public at large and monetize them via Ocean Marketplace
(Ocean Protocol Foundation, 2020). Furthermore, VitaDAO could attach these data assets to NFTs,
where useful and applicable. This would drive fluid price discovery and liquidity for each individual
data set, as buyers and sellers engage around individual data sets and curate the most valuable
findings. The overall value of VITA tokens could then be derived through the sum of its individual
priced data assets, IP assets and liquidity pools. The applications around composability and
interoperability here are manifold and will be fully explored once first versions are in production.
Finally, obfuscation of data assets and enabling secure computation on them will be a highly relevant
future use case that could be facilitated by Web3 data protocols such as Ocean Protocol.
Data assets could include, but are not limited to: laboratory updates and reports, processed data,
quarterly updates, western blot data, qPCR data, cell culture experiments, survival analysis, sequence
data, western blot gels, microscopy and cell culture. These data assets could be in the forms of raw
data CSV files, images or PDFs.
The type of data assets and their monetization potential are summarized below:
1. Public Data Assets: all data in these assets are viewable by members, which can vote to list
these data packages on Ocean Marketplace.
2. IP Data Assets: Required for filing of patents or further IP. These assets will be obfuscated as
they could compromise filing of IP. These assets could be uploaded to Ocean Marketplace, as
soon as IP has been filed to protect them.
3. Progress Data Assets: intended to keep DAO members up-to-date on ongoing research
findings and serving as proof of progress. This data has a certain level of obfuscation,
meaning that any information that could compromise the intellectual property itself will be
hidden. Such data would not be relevant for Ocean Marketplace.
Members wishing to engage with the IP, review the data assets directly, or engage with the council,
will need to submit KYC documentation and sign non-compete and confidentiality agreements. This
helps ensure the viability of the IP for all members.
5 Staking & Signalling
VITA tokens may be used to signal long-term support for individual projects. A member may stake
their VITA tokens for a set time period until a project milestone is reached (e.g. 3M/6M/12M). Project
milestones are predetermined by projects and measurable. However, their outcome is uncertain,
meaning members take additional risk by foregoing liquidity.
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When a milestone is reached, staked tokens are unlocked. In return for locking tokens, VitaDAO pays
out regular signalling rewards to stakers. This process sends valuable signals to the market, as it
showcases the confidence of members in specific projects. Furthermore, it reduces volatility and
creates a circular economy to members, which actively contribute value and review project success.
It is anticipated that signalling will be implemented after the first successful project has run an initial
funding cycle, giving members time to sufficiently model this mechanism and implement it in
VitaDAO V2.
6 Genesis & First Project Lifecycle
The following section details the initial Genesis project acquisition and models out a first potential
project lifecycle. After successful completion of its Genesis Liquidity Bootstrapping and instantiation
of its governance mechanism, VitaDAO members will vote to incorporate the first longevity
therapeutic into its collective. Molecule will propose to attach one of its longevity projects with the
Scheibye-Knudsen Laboratory at the University of Copenhagen to an NFT and sell this to VitaDAO.
Once the sale is complete, members can vote to allocate a first tranche of funding to the University of
Copenhagen to commence research.
The first project lifecycle could operate as follows:
1. Molecule proposes to VitaDAO to purchase the Scheibye-Knudsen Laboratory IP as an NFT.
2. VitaDAO members vote on the proposal and define the project parameters and payment
schedules with the Scheibye-Knudsen Laboratory.
3. The project commences, as VitaDAO completes a first payment to initiate the preclinical
studies.
4. The Scheibye-Knudsen Laboratory begins delivering first data assets consisting of progress
reports, raw data and initial findings.
5. First definitive findings are in, and VitaDAO members, with the support of industry advisors,
decide on how to use the data and further commercialise the asset. This could result in:
a. File for further IP and patents.
b. File for clinical trials and further studies.
c. Monetize the data sets through Ocean Marketplace.
6. Simultaneously, VitaDAO may decide to launch further Liquidity Bootstrapping Pools for
additional projects at any point, which are sourced through its community, or to raise
additional funding for the Scheibye-Knudsen Laboratory.
7 Exit Scenarios and IP Commercialisation
Finally, if the research data surrounding an asset is sufficiently positive and clinical trials attractive,
VitaDAO can license or sell its IP or data to institutional stakeholders, such as pharmaceutical or
biotech companies. Given enough liquidity and governance sophistication, VitaDAO could even
attempt to bring these assets to market itself. Members of VitaDAO decide how to distribute income
generated from successful IP monetization.
Individual IP and NFTs may be spun out into separate refractionalized markets to enable more
granular participation by the public. From a technical perspective, this would entail moving the NFT
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and associated data sets out of custodianship of VitaDAO into a sub-DAO represented by a new
ERC20 token. Members of VitaDAO may elect to spin out a project to:
1. Enable the project and IP to raise additional funding from a wider community.
2. Create exit scenarios for VitaDAO and further decentralize project ownership.
3. Enable more granular fundability and participation on a project level.
8 Open Research Questions
The mechanics described in this paper are novel, experimental and rely on multiple moving parts,
especially the creation of an active tokenized governance community. Our goal is to tackle these
questions together as a community and through multiple working groups that contain industry experts,
as they will substantially improve the system’s long-term potential.
1. Governance and effective collective decision-making around drug development projects:
can a decentralized community effectively govern and attract the expertise required to
successfully commercialize therapeutics? Will the token-based voting mechanism described
herein succeed in generating positive outcomes?
2. Biopharma business logic: will the biopharma industry be open to purchasing IP and patents
produced by a decentralized collective, as opposed to current business practices? Will
VitaDAO be able to support a sufficient number of projects to become positive sum at scale?
3. Legal and patent law: can VitaDAO successfully file for further patents on the IP assets it
manages or will it have to rely on third parties? In case of patent litigation against VitaDAO,
is it able to protect the validity of the IP as a normal company could?
9 Conclusion
The open IP and data ownership structures presented here could help to alleviate some of the most
severe challenges in the current pharmaceutical and biotech pipeline and help create a future of open
and democratic ownership of longevity therapeutics.
First, IP collectives like VitaDAO could help realign incentives with neglected stakeholder groups -
patients and scientists - by creating alternative democratic research structures that distribute value and
governance more evenly. Imagine research on a new breakthrough insulin treatment funded by
diabetics who believed in it and stand to benefit the most from it. What would this do to access and
pricing?
Second, separating R&D data creation from IP ownership helps overcome a costly principal-agent
dilemma and the current reproducibility crisis. In an openly traded curation market and structure, both
negative and positive data might surface much sooner and the best therapeutics succeed. Third,
transparent financialization of data and open composability with decentralised financial markets
opens up entirely new and accelerated funding models to promising scientists and laboratories across
the globe.
From an industry perspective, we believe that IP cooperatives like VitaDAO could be a win-win
situation for all stakeholders: biopharma, researchers, and patients. It combines traditional industry IP
holding structures with novel tokenized ownership accessible by anyone wishing to contribute to the
research. In doing so, it drives valuable innovation in the biopharma industry.
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